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Political Representation of Ethnic 
Minorities in Romania Elections 2004 
OANA-VALENTINA  SUCIU 
 
 
SOME THEORETICAL AND LEGISLATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
The ethnic party is just one of the newly-born parties after the fall of com-
munism in Central and Eastern Europe, among the parties of mass democratic 
movements, the remnants of the former communist parties, the so-called ”histori-
cal parties”, the religious parties (mainly Christian-democrats), the nationalist par-
ties and the ”new politics” parties such as the Greens or the feminists. Romania is 
no exception from these trends. 
A variety of electoral paradigms for the ethnic minorities has been established. 
For the region’s largest minorities – the ones who were able to mobilise enough in 
order to pass the electoral thresholds – the parliamentarian representation has been 
secured through proportional representation1. But this is not a natural phenome-
non, since not all the countries in the region considered that the voices of the ethnic 
minorities should be heard in the legislative body of the country. This is how the 
situation of the political representation of the ethnic minorities in Central and East-
ern Europe stands for the time being: 
Table 1 
Political Representation of Ethnic Minority Groups  
in Central and Eastern Europe 
Country Percentage of 
Minorities 
Legal Situation Parliamentary  
Representation 
Albania             3% Opposed to representation YES 
Bulgaria 8.5% Opposed to representation YES 
Czech  
Republic 
– Recognition but not granting  
parliamentary seats 
YES – 1990 – 1992 
NO – 1996 – 1998 
Hungary             4% Recognition but not granting 
parliamentary seats 
NO 
Moldova 13.8% Ignorance of minorities NO 
Poland  1.3% Recognition but not granting 
parliamentary seats 
YES 
                                                
1 Carlos FLORES JUBERIAS, ”Postcommunist Electoral Systems and National Minorities: A 
Dilemma in Five Paradigms”, in J.P. STEIN (ed.), The Politics of National Minority Participation in 
Post-Communist Europe. State-Building, Democracy, and Ethnic Mobilization, East West Institute, M.E. 
Sharpe Armonk, New York, 2000. 
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Country Percentage of 
Minorities 
Legal Situation Parliamentary  
Representation 
Romania 10.5% Grant of a parliamentary seat YES 
Russia  3.8% Ignorance of minorities NO 
Slovakia 10.6% Recognition but not granting 
parliamentary seats 
YES 
Slovenia              3% Grant of a parliamentary seat1 NO 
Ukraine           22% Ignorance of minorities NO 
 
Source: Rubén RUIZ RUFINO, ”Ethnic Parliamentary Incorporation in Central and Eastern 
Europe: Finding a Mechanical Explanation”, Paper presented at the 4th Annual Graduate 
Student Retreat of the Society for Comparative Research, Madrid, 2002, p. 16. 
 
However, the successful ethnic parties (see not only the positive case of Ro-
mania, but also the one of Bulgaria, which is less favourable from the legislative 
point of view, since the Constitution officially bans any ethnic based organization 
to run in elections as a regular political party) have won a long-lasting electoral 
support and have maintained a relatively high degree of party discipline, while 
the electoral stimuli for majority party initiators to sharpen the ideological differ-
ences only managed to exacerbate rather than soften the ethnic conflicts. More-
over, the parties are not only mediators of conflicts but also, as Lipset and 
Rokkan2 have proposed, they place themselves as attraction poles that act as pro-
fessional brokers of ethnicity. 
According to these criteria an ethnic party is an organization that aims to repre-
sent an ethnic group; it introduces itself as the bearer of the interests of an ethnic group to 
the exclusion of others (which means that representation is the central pillar of the party’s 
mobilizing strategy) and aims to win political power in order to increase the impact of rela-
tive power and of the position of that ethnic group. 
The political demands of minorities are based on one fundamental concern: the 
desire to preserve their identity and protection against discrimination. In addition, access to 
resources managed or controlled by the state is a great concern to many ethnic minorities. 
We reach at this point the issue of political representation through parties. Ac-
cording Best and Cotta3, representation is ”the ’hinge’ between society and polity, 
                                                
1 According to Deets, there are two seats, one for the Hungarian minority and one for the 
Italian minority, the so-called ”historical minorities” (Steven DEETS, ”Reconsidering East European 
Minority Policy: Liberal Theory and European Norms”, in East European Politics and Societies, 
vol. 16, no. 1, 2002, pp. 52-53). The system clearly grants positive discrimination, but the practice 
has been criticized by other ethnic groups, such as the Serbs and Croats, who were not provided 
with the same advantages, although their numbers exceed the ones of the Hungarians and 
Italians. For more details, see Ciprian-Călin ALIONESCU, ”Parliamentary Representation of 
Minorities in Romania”, in Southest European Politics, June 2004, vol. V, no. 1, pp. 60-75. 
2 Seymour Martin LIPSET and Stein ROKKAN, ”Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and 
Voter Alignments”, in IDEM (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives, 
The Free Press, New York, 1967, p. 3. 
3 Heinrich BEST and Maurizio COTTA, ”Elite Transformation and Models of Representation 
since the Mid-Nineteenth Century: Some Theoretical Considerations”, in IDEM (eds.), Parliamen-
tary Representatives in Europe: 1848-2000, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, p. 3. 
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through which social conflict and authority structures are translated into political 
action, but at the same time political actors guide, reshape and reinterpret the de-
mands of society”. Representation is never a purely passive process of translation 
of society into politics. In fact, it is also a much more active process through which 
social elements are ”politicised” and thus in fact changed. The political actors of 
representation (be they individual leaders or organized groups such as parties) are 
a relatively independent variable that shapes the political expression of society1. 
One of the main concerns of the ethnic movements is represented by influencing 
the governing process, as we shall see in the case of the most recent general elec-
tions in November-December 2004 in Romania. The rational request to efficiently 
convert political resources into power generates, at least within the pluralist democ-
racies, the tendency to politicise the ethnic differences too. This might be the expla-
nation, at least in the Romanian framework, of the existence of over 30 ethnic based 
organizations, out of which 19 have parliamentarian representation. It should be 
added that, if the rules of the electoral game would make no exceptions, only the 
Hungarian minority representatives would be able to pass the electoral threshold. 
The ”representation” of the ethnic party is defined as the average percentage 
of seats won by the party when compared with the percentage of the population 
that forms that group2. From the consociational point of view, the essential factor 
that promotes accepting democracy among the ethnic group is the degree in which 
that ethnic group is proportionally politically represented. 
Immediately after the Romanian appraisal in December 1989, the position of 
the ethnic minorities visibly improved3. However, many gains were considered re-
versible because they lacked firm legal safeguards. Leaders of ethnic minorities 
were concerned over certain articles in Romania’s new Constitution, which defined 
the country as a ”unitary national state” with prohibitions on activities deemed to 
be ”separatist”. They feared that this could provide a constitutional underpinning 
for a possible future ban on ethnic political parties. Although this did not happen, 
the phrasing can still be found in the new shape of the Fundamental Law, adopted 
through a referendum in October 2003. According to the Constitution: ”Each of the 
organizations of citizens belonging to national minorities, that meet in elections the 
number of votes for being represented in the Parliament, have the right to one 
deputy seat under the condition of the electoral law. The citizens of a national mi-
nority can be represented only by one organization”. But as far as ethnic minorities 
are concerned, the Electoral Law has a restrictive, even discriminatory, character. 
Art. 4, align. 1, stipulates that ”under the present law, by an ethnic minority we 
understand the ethnic group represented in the National Minority Council”4. The 
article hence drastically limits the possibility for an ethnic based formation, which 
is not represented in the Council, to run in elections, as if only this organism were 
entitled to accredit the membership to a certain ethnic group. The law also men-
tions in Art. 4, align. 2, that ”according to Art. 62, align. 2 of the republished Con-
stitution of Romania, legally founded ethnic minority organizations, defined 
                                                
1 Ibidem, pp. 7-8. 
2 John ISHYIAMA, ”Ethnopolitical Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Post-Com-
munist Eastern Europe”, in Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, vol. 7, no. 3, Autumn 2001, p. 31. 
3 Janusz BUGAJSKI, Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe: A Guide to Nationality Policies, Orga-
nizations and Parties, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York, p. 203. 
4 Legislaţie privind alegerile parlamentare şi prezidenţiale 2004, Editura Regia Autonomă „Moni-
torul Oficial“, Bucureşti, p. 6. 
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according to align. 1, which did not obtain a deputy or a senator mandate, have the 
right to a deputy mandate, if they have obtained a number of votes equal to at least 
10% of the average country number of valid expressed votes for the election of one 
deputy”1. The ethnic parties/formations (except UDMR) represent politically 2.17% 
of the country’s population (stressing that, due to the Electoral Law, 0.71 of the in-
dividuals belonging to an ethnic minority group are parliamentary represented). 
By accepting a lower electoral threshold of votes2 for the minority organiza-
tions in parliamentary elections, one promotes a form of positive discrimination. 
Although the provision favours the small ethnic groups, it encourages competition 
rather than cooperation among these groups. Moreover, only one of the minority 
organizations (or parties) officially recognized has the right to obtain funding from 
the National Minority Council. The representation system starts from the false pre-
sumption that ethnic parties are unitary political actors. For example, Art. 4, align. 3 
stipulates that ”the ethnic minority organizations that are represented in the Par-
liament can run in elections”, whereas similar organizations, but not parliamentary 
represented, are subjected to much harsher conditions – they have to gather signa-
tures from at least 15% of the citizens who are listed by the most recent census 
(2002) as belonging to that particular ethnic group. But this reference does not take 
into account an aspect of individual rights, that is the fact that each citizen of a 
country can declare himself or herself in the census as belonging to a certain ethnic 
group (the majority one, most of the times), even if he/she actually belongs to an-
other ethnic group. It is a strictly personal matter, and a law in this regard only 
comes to narrow both the individual and the collective rights. 
Since 1990 the ethnic parties have undergone a professionalisation process, 
along with those who work in these organizations: they run in elections as normal 
parties – due to the proportional representation system they can present the same 
list in several constituencies, since the Electoral Law allows that ”organizations of 
citizens belonging to national minorities can submit the same candidates list for the 
Chamber of Deputies in several constituencies” 3. 
THE CENTRAL ELECTORAL BUREAU  
AND THE CANDIDATES’ ODYSSEY 
According to the same Law, elections are organised by the Central Electoral 
Bureau. In the case of the 2004 elections, this institution represented one of the cor-
ner stones for the ethnic minority organizations that intended to run in elections. 
Through the documents that it has released starting with mid-October 2004, one 
could say that the Central Electoral Bureau set the basis for two trends that marked 
                                                
1 Ibidem, p. 6. 
2 While a deputy needs 70 000 votes, the representative of an ethnic party only needs ap-
proximately 6 000 votes to be elected in the Parliament. The problem lies with the ethnic minori-
ties that do not exceed 5-6 000 members (for more details, see Table 2). In this case, the candidates 
try to target the majority population as well and in some cases they even manage to obtain votes – 
the most interesting cases are represented by the Albanians, Armenians, Macedonians and 
Ruthenians, who obtained 10, sometimes even 15 times more votes than the figures indicated by 
the censuses. 
3 Legislaţie privind alegerile parlamentare..., art. cit., p. 7. 
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the electoral campaign: by refusing the right to run in elections of certain or-
ganizations it has generated what the central media labelled as the ”Hungar-
ian-Hungarian conflict”, and on the other hand it sharpened the internal conflicts 
with the organizations of other ethnic minority groups. 
The ”Minoritarul” Case 
The most frequent excuse used by the Central Electoral Bureau for rejecting 
candidateship was the unsuitability or of the lack of originality of the electoral 
signs: this is the situation of organizations such as the Cultural Albanians’ League, 
the Szeklers’ Union, the Civic Hungarian Union or the Ukrainians’ Democrat Un-
ion. Other organizations that were denied entry to the electoral game in 2004 are 
the Cultural Union of Ethnic Poles, the Russians’ Association and the Italians’ As-
sociation in Romania. In the latter case, random checks cross-verified with the cen-
sus information proved that the Suceava and Iaşi counties, where the Association 
had raised around 500 signatures (according to the Electoral Law this figure being 
enough), are inhabited by less than 100 Italians. The Szeklers’ Union and the Rus-
sians’ Association were excluded because they are not members in the National 
Minority Council, whereas the Cultural Union of Ethnic Poles represented the in-
vestigation topic of the prosecutor’s office for the very simple reason that the sig-
natures represented Romanian names!? It is probably forbidden in the view of the 
Romanian prosecutor’s office to have a typical Romanian name and to be at the 
same time a member of a minority ethnic group1. 
The positive discrimination that was initially intended generated in fact con-
flicts within the different ethnic groups since, as previously noted, these are not 
unitary actors, and indeed often embark on interminable conflicts for control over 
the resources. The relationship between the members of a minority ethnic group 
and those who claim to represent this group is a complex one. Organizations of 
representatives of ethnic minorities can take many forms, and the ethnic-parties 
are just one variety of patterns. Often the borderlines between political, cultural 
and religious organizations representing minorities are very thin; for instance, 
UDMR includes sixteen different parties and associations, its membership being 
”organized in a loose structure of local chapters that were in turn grouped into 
autonomous county branches”2. The membership of the number of people that are 
actively involved in these organizations varies. They also receive different levels of 
support among those whom they claim to represent. Within the democratic politi-
cal systems, the measurable support for parties and movements ranges from per-
centages that might not allow them to pass the electoral thresholds to about 90% of 
                                                
1 However, in the 2000-2004 legislature the fact that the last name of the former Italian’s 
representative ends in ”-escu” did not meet any protests, even though the representative herself 
has very loose links with this ethnic group. Indeed, the Italians’ Association in Romania and the 
ROAS-IT contested the right of the former MP to re-run in elections. Moreover, she has been 
contested by the other organizations of the Italians, especially since in 2000 she ran for an organi-
zation – Italians’ Community in Romania (CIR) that chose not to present the same candidate in all 
the constituencies. 
2 Janusz BUGAJSKI, Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe: A Guide to Nationality Policies, Organi-
zations and Parties, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York, p. 217. 
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the minority population. When representatives of minorities are politically di-
vided, forming competing and quarrelling parties and movements, the discord 
may be the result of the socio-economic, political ideological or cultural differences 
within the minority population. More often however, this is caused by the conflict-
ing ambitions of parties and movements and individual politicians, and does not 
actually reflect the situation of the voters. It is the case of the Ukrainian minority: 
the Ukrainians’ Democratic Union in Romania – UDUR – contested the registration 
of the Ukrainians’ Union in Romania – UUR, based on the allegations that the lat-
ter had collaborated with the communist secret services, Securitate (these facts did 
not prevent though the election of UUR’s candidate in the Chamber of Deputies). 
The same applies to the Polish minority: the Poles’ Union in Romania, officially 
supported by the Polish Embassy in Romania, contested the Arad’s Youth’s As-
sault and the Poles’ Cultural Union (with the headquarters in Craiova). The Polish 
MP was worried that a possible defeat in the race for the deputy seat might trans-
late into a lack of funding in support of the Suceava county cultural premises, a 
North-Western region where most of the Romanian Poles are located. 
On November 18th 2004, the Cotidianul daily printed the following heading: 
”The Minoritarian Affair – Entering the Parliament has become lucrative business. 
This is how many of the eligible places of many of the minority organizations are 
occupied by Romanians, who have absolutely no connection with the minority in 
question”1. It is the case of deputy Vasile Savu, whom, according to Varujan Pam-
buccian, the leader of the ethnic minorities parliamentarian group, nobody had 
seen in Parliament for over 18 months during a four-year term. Trade union leader 
in the Jiu Valley2 and close to the former governing party PSD, Savu had appar-
ently ”discovered” his Macedonian roots and even established an association (the 
pre-existing organization of the ”Slavic Macedonians” had excluded him from its 
ranks); in this way he also entered in conflict with Sorin Dimitriu, former top 
PNŢCD member and director of the State Property Fund, who admitted that he 
does not posses Macedonian origins but feels professionally close to this ethnic 
group, whom he would enjoy to represent. 
The same daily identifies the situation of Mihai Florin Luican, former Bucha-
rest prefect, ranking 8th at the internal elections in PSD, who re-appeared at the top 
of the list of the newly-founded Bulgarians’ Cultural Association, competing, even-
tually unsuccessfully, with the Banat Bulgarian Union. 
Also in the case of the Croatians, shortly before elections, the former PSD 
senator Ion Vela, former chancellor of the ”Eftimie Murgu” in Reşiţa3, re-vitalised 
the Croatians’ Democratic Union, an organization that during the 2000 elections 
had not succeeded to pass the special electoral threshold. It did manage to gather 
7 000 votes in 2004, however insufficient to defeat the well-known Croatians’ Un-
ion in Romania, led by deputy Mihai Radan. The latter declared that he did not 
fear his counter-candidate, who actually admitted not having Croatian origins, but 
                                                
1 ”Afacerea ’Minoritarul’”, n.a., http://www.cotidianul.ro, accessed November 18th, 2004. 
2 Actually, Savu was the one to replace the notorious coal miners’ leader Miron Cozma 
(himself one of the subjects to be tackled with during and immediately after the electoral campaign) 
after his imprisonment in 1999. During the 2000 elections even the Embassy of the Republic of 
Macedonia found this candidateship outrageous and had issued an official contestation, especially 
since it is not clear if such a minority actually exists in Romania. 
3 Information extracted from Cartea Albastră a Democraţiei. Un ghid al instituţiilor publice cen-
trale din România, Asociaţia Pro-Democraţia, Bucureşti, 2001, p. 82. 
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that in this way the ”constitutional principle advancing the representation of mi-
norities” was not respected. Dare we note that such a consideration enters in con-
flict with the justifications provided by the Central Electoral Bureau itself when it 
had rejected the candidateship of several formations based on the Romanian sonor-
ity of the names! Art. 4, align. 3, stating the obligation to confirm one’s member-
ship to a certain minority through the census seemed to be forgotten. 
The ”Hungarian-Hungarian” Conflicts 
As for the relationship between the organizations that represent the Hungarian 
minority in Romania, tensions could be observed between the Hungarians’ 
Democratic Alliance (UDMR), the Hungarians’ Civic Union (UCM – separated from 
UDMR not long before the local elections in June 2004) and the Szeklers’ Union in 
Romania. The Central Electoral Bureau prevented the latter two from running in the 
general elections. Both of them resorted to enrolments on the lists of other organiza-
tions, a manoeuvre accepted by the Electoral Law. The Szeklers’ Union1 initially 
moved towards the New Generation Party (PNG), but the limited support granted 
to this party determined their orientation towards the Great Romania Party (PRM), 
a quite bizarre change of direction in the context of the anti-Hungarian behaviour of 
this party from its very beginnings in 1990. But even the second place on the list for 
the Senate in the Mureş county, generously offered by PRM to Kálman Kiss did not 
lead to the parliamentarian representation of this formation. 
The relationship between UCM and UDMR is even more complicated. For the 
second time (the first time being during the local elections, in June 2004) the latter 
prevented the former to apply for running in elections. The central media from Oc-
tober 20th-22nd 2004 participated to the competition with titles that usually hook the 
public: ”Hungarian-Hungarian War at the Central Electoral Bureau” (Evenimentul 
Zilei), ”Once Again – UCM Prevented by the PSD-UDMR-PRM Coalition to Run in 
Elections” (Curentul), ”Bleak Days for Béla Markó2 – UCM Applies for Elections” 
(Cotidianul), etc. The press communiqué released by the Central Electoral Bureau 
justified the invalidation solution by the fact that the checking of the support sig-
natures for this formation presented irregularities such as signatures belonging to 
deceased or fictitious people, to persons from the majoritarian population, all of 
which eventually led to an insufficient number of supporters. At the same time, the 
response came one day later than the deadline for enlisting as a candidate party, 
preventing UCM is prevented to record its electoral sign, a sign contested by the 
Green Party in Romania. Moreover, some of the supporters received phone-calls 
and direct inquiries from the Prosecutor’s Office or from the Police, which, in the 
opinion of UCM’s president, Zsolt Szilagy, is in itself an act of intimidation3. The 
Executive Board of UDMR came forward to support the Central Electoral Bureau’s 
decision and released a communiqué in this regard. The question regarding to the 
                                                
1 This formation is not a new one. In the 90s it ran in elections under a different name (The 
Liberal-Democrat Union of the Hungarians), and it is the reason why during the 2000 local 
elections UDMR missed by 800 votes the City Hall of Târgu Mureş (out of which 700 went to the 
party led by Kálman Kiss). 
2 UDMR’s candidate for the presidential elections and the president of the party. 
3 Press conference given on Thursday, October 21st 2004, by deputy Zsolt Szilagyi. 
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manner in which UDMR got hold of detailed information regarding the non-valid 
signatures is explained through the presence of one UDMR member in the Bureau, 
who could verify the validity of the information. 
The conflict was alleviated by the offer launched to UCM on October 28th 2004 
by the Popular Action; the former conditions though the partnership by the inclu-
sion of the autonomy issue onto AP’s programme and by the placement on the top 
positions of the UCM candidates in the counties with a predominant Hungarian 
population. In Mr. Anton Niculescu’s opinion1, ”they should have been construc-
tive, if they really wanted to represent the community. The fact that they accepted 
to run on AP’s lists proves that they only want to get us out of the Parliament” 2. 
But the party did not exceed 0.5% on average per country at the November 28th 
elections, even less than the public opinion polls run on the Hungarian population 
had predicted before the elections3. 
CAMPAIGN LOG 
The topic of ”autonomy” is not an ”original” one, and it can be traced through 
the UDMR programmes starting with 1996 electoral campaign; it was resumed in 
2000 and then forcefully revived during the 2004 electoral campaign. It is the red 
thread of UDMR’s programme, which also counts chapters dealing with the econ-
omy, justice and health systems. These latter three topics are to be found in the 
programmes of other formations such as the German Democratic Forum (FDGR). 
Since our space for analysis is a limited one, the focus will lay on three case stud-
ies: UDMR, FDGR and UAR (the Armenians’ Union in Romania). The relevant in-
formation has been gathered from the sites of these organizations or through 
interviews with their representatives; in fact, these are the only formations that 
introduce themselves to their constituencies and to the rest of the voters through 
well-designed and comprehensive web pages. 
Apparently, the issue of Internet accessibility might seem frivolous and incon-
sequential, but it is the only instrument (except face-to-face interviews) that pro-
vides information regarding the political activity of the representatives of the 
ethnic minorities. If the lack of communication could be understood through the 
limited financial possibilities, their lack of parliamentary activity cannot. For in-
stance, ”between December 2000 and February 2003, the yearly average number of 
parliamentary speeches made by the 17 MPs from the group of non-Hungarian 
minorities (not counting the group leader4) was only 5.6 (the same average for 
UDMR was 17.5, and for one of the opposition parties, the National-Liberals, 21.1). 
                                                
1 Mr. Anton Niculescu is executive vice-president of the UDMR responsible for European 
Integration issues and EU counsellor of President Béla Markó. 
2 Interview taken on November 24th, 2004, at the UDMR headquarters in Bucharest. 
3 A public opinion poll ordered by UDMR in September 2004 to the Centre for Research of 
Interethnic Relations (CCRIT) shows that UCM was credited with 4.7% of the votes of the 
Hungarians living in Romania. Nevertheless, it is difficult to count how many votes the UCM 
really received in the elections of 2004 – what is clear though is that in the counties inhabited 
mainly by Hungarians, AP (the ”host” of UCM) received most of the votes, exceeding the country 
average (3 295 in Covasna and 3 819 in Harghita, which still mean less than 4.7%). 
4 Deputy Varujan Pambuccian (n.a.). 
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The absolute record in this regard belongs to the representatives of the Italians, 
Russians and ”Macedonians”: one intervention each in more than two years; and 
their one intervention was the oath of allegiance to Romania, compulsory for all 
MPs!). Also, throughout the period surveyed, they endorsed just one legislative 
proposal1 (written by another MP)”2. Should one still wonder at the quality of the 
political representation provided by such a ”peaceful” and ”silent” group! 
UDMR – The Hungarians’ Democratic Alliance 
UDMR’s slogan is ”Together for Autonomy”, and the organization’s candidate 
to the presidency of Romania based his electoral programme on three main slo-
gans: EU integration, autonomy and wealth (or well-being). A new element in the 
electoral supply of UDMR is the proposal to modify the list of developing regions 
and speed up the decentralization process, (the target group for these issues repre-
senting the Hungarian electorate in the counties of Harghita, Covasna and Mureş). 
UDMR’s political programme is an extremely specific one3, being co-ordinated by 
the MPs from the parliamentarian committees, according to the topic of interest. In 
the file on economy, UDMR’s programme is liberal in orientation4; further, it also 
speaks about the importance of having civil society keep the state institutions un-
der its control, and of maintaining these institutions strong and independent in 
their turn. UDMR is an organization that declares double-objectives, ethnic and na-
tional ones. The main ethnic objective refers to the elimination of discrimination 
and with changing the anti-Hungarian feelings in Romania. It also supports the re-
quests for ”cultural and regional autonomy”, including separate educational insti-
tutions and autonomous churches. It asks for the local autonomy of the prefects 
and the civil servants from the Transylvanian counties with a majority of Hungar-
ian population, and is careful to present these claims more in the context of reform 
of the local public administration, rather than as specific questions dealing with the 
ethnic minorities. 
As a further expression of the quest for autonomous self-government, UDMR 
restructured itself in 1993 on the model of a mini-Parliament. For many years, it 
had been the only Romanian party that organized ”primaries” before deciding 
                                                
1 The bill for a Law of Ethnic Minorities (also put forward by Mr. Pambuccian, in an 
attempt to erase what he called ”the ethno-business”), eventually rejected by the plenary session 
of the Parliament. 
2 Ciprian-Călin ALIONESCU, art. cit., p. 69. 
3 During this interview I asked Mr. Anton Niculescu if they had taken into account the 
amount of patience that is required of the sympathizers willing to read this programme, con-
sidering that the published version exceeds 30 pages. He responded that: ”No one really reads 
programmes. What I want to stress here is that, starting with 1996, the economic aspects became 
stronger, more important than before. There are much more social issues, there are many prom-
ises, plans related to less ethnically specific issues. We had the same programme in 1996 and in 
2000, worded/elaborated by very many experts in various domains of general interest. This 
year’s novelty is the fact that we have received a lot of inputs on our website from people who 
thought that they had something important to say in this respect, and we have included a lot of 
suggestions. The coordinators of the draft programme were the deputies and senators from rele-
vant standing committees of Parliament”.  
4 N.B. ”Liberal” in the classical sense, i.e. on a left-right spectrum heading towards the right. 
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who is going to run in elections. Although a very democratic method, it is never-
theless a very expensive one, maximizing the risk to have only the members of a 
certain professional group as potential representatives. In 2004 UDMR allowed 
people of Hungarian descent, but who were not necessarily members of the Union, 
to run in the internal elections, seeking to present further proof that the candidates’ 
lists are not marshaled at the Bucharest headquarters1. It is a transparent manner 
that even their political opponents admire. 
But what do Hungarians in Romania want? A public opinion poll run by the 
Centre for Research of Interethnic Relations (CCRIT) in September 2004 shows that 
the most ardent problems of the average Hungarian are: wages/pensions – 53%, 
tax reduction – 43.4%, eradicating corruption – 40.3%, whereas the top issues in 
UDMR’s programme gather much lower percentages: the Szeklers’ regional 
autonomy – 9.2%, proportional representation – 9.2%, and Hungarian departments 
within the Babeş-Bolyai University – 6.5%. The questions perceived by the Hungar-
ian leaders to be extremely important are, in fact, even less important for the Hun-
garian electorate: the retrocession of property – 7.2%, cultural autonomy – 3.9%, 
and the retrocession of Church buildings – 3%. We cite the explanation offered by 
Mr. Anton Niculescu: ”It has always been like that, one could suspect Hungarians 
of schizophrenia. The main concerns, requests, and problems of the Hungarians 
are almost synonymous with the ones of the majority. And it has always been like 
that; there is nothing new here. This is what we found in our surveys. The issue of 
autonomy, the university, even EU integration, are somewhere not on the top of 
the list. However, why do Hungarians vote for UDMR, who has a backwards-posi-
tioned agenda? Because these mainly emotional, apparently ’less-valued’ elements 
on its agenda do not exist in the supply of the other parties. Hungarians know that 
if Markó is to be the Ministry of Economy, points 1, 2, 3, 4 are still not going to be 
solved. However, PNL, PD, PSD do not have projects that cover our specific re-
quests in their programmes. So, it is positions 7, 8, 9 for which Hungarians vote for 
UDMR. This might be the explanation. Otherwise, Hungarians have exactly the 
same problems as Romanians do. On the other hand, they have a few requirements 
that are not being satisfied or nothing is being promised in relation to those spe-
cific issues, desires, needs. It is the law of supply and demand”. This opinion is 
confirmed by a brief research on the web-sites of the main Romanian political par-
ties. The offer related to the rights of ethnic minorities is totally lacking. Moreover, 
in an intervention dated April 8th 2003, Eugen Nicolăescu, a top member of the Na-
tional Liberal Party, notes: ”UDMR launched several messages, proved that it 
could play with anybody if things turn out all right, without caring, which we do 
not mind, but there is a problem when the elementary norms of functioning of the 
Romanian society are trespassed through protocols for parliamentary support”. 
The text refers to a possible enclavisation of Romania, based on the creation of eco-
nomic development regions based on ethnic criteria. 
The same survey reveals that, in September 2004, 78% of the Hungarians would 
have agreed to a possible collaboration with PSD; however, even at that time, 
UDMR had not excluded collaboration with other political parties: ”Based on clear 
and firm conditions we could collaborate with both political poles. It is only natural. 
                                                
1 According to Mr. Anton Niculescu, this democratic approach is precisely the explanation 
for the attacks to which UDMR has been subjected after the defeat of several non-UDMR 
members (UCM representatives) in the ”primary” elections. 
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We do have our own interests, but Romania is also interested to collaborate with the 
Hungarians” declared the president of UDMR1. Constant in the options of his elec-
torate, Béla Markó oriented his presidential campaign mostly towards the Hungar-
ian voters, as opposed to his predecessor in 2000, Gyorgy Frunda, who permanently 
targeted with his messages the majority of Romania’s electorate. 
In rational choice terms, it is however very probable that Hungarians will not 
participate in the political activities of UDMR since they do not expect to receive 
”benefits” that could exceed the ”costs” of participation. Since ethnic parties do not 
generate private benefits for their constituencies, there should be another explana-
tion for choosing these parties. It seems that the benefits offered by UDMR to its 
voters are those public goods that provide for general well-being. Moreover, 
UDMR is a long term oriented political party, a fact that might not be that clear to 
its electorate; nevertheless, the voting outcome proved that these objectives (de-
scentralization, autonomy, the retrocession of property, market economy) did 
eventually appeal to the Hungarian electorate. This aspect, coupled with the disci-
pline of the Hungarian voters2, explains the constant success of the party in the 
elections. Due to the voting history – both the figures (although these decreased in 
recent years), and their territorial distribution – the number of UDMR MPs, as well 
as the constituencies that they shall represent, are quite easy to guess. 
FDGR – The German Democratic Forum in Romania 
The German Democratic Forum in Romania represented the pleasant surprise 
of the local elections, held in June 2004. Except the by now famous case of the 
mayor of Sibiu, Mr. Klaus Johannis, another 8 German mayors were elected, to-
gether with 11 country councillors and 96 local councillors3. This is quite a success, 
when nowadays, at least officially, less than 60 000 Germans live in Romania. 
These results occasioned the proliferation of the opinion that voting on ethnic cri-
teria was out of fashion; some analysts even spoke of a change in mentality, since it 
was absolutely clear that the Romanian population had supported the FDGR can-
didates. These were also backed by the Hungarians, who in turn had been voted 
by the Romanian population on several occasions. 
Under these circumstances, FDGR started to aspire to its own parliamentarian 
group and launched a unique list for the Chamber of Deputies in the electoral 
struggle for the general elections, supporting an independent candidate, Mr. Eber-
hard Wolfgang Wittstock, for the Senate race. 
The cornerstone of the Forum’s programme was represented by the economic 
chapter, stressing the necessity and importance of attracting foreign investors. 
Supporting the young people was another important aspect (”so that they would 
not leave the country” – this is not only the case of the German or Hungarian mi-
norities; a simple look at the census data proves that during the last decade the 
                                                
1 See the Curentul daily, October 26th, 2004. 
2 The fact that the Hungarian voters that did turn out in the second round of the presidential 
elections on December 12th 2004 apparently followed the recommendation from the centre, i.e. to 
vote for Adrian Năstase, is only illustrative in this regard. 
3 Divers News Bulletin, July 1st 2004. 
154 OANA-VALENTINA SUCIU 
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. V • no. 1 • 2005 
number of most of the ethnic minorities, except the Rroma, has decreased1), to-
gether with the education and health systems (objectives that are extensively de-
veloped in UDMR’s project too), culture, international relations, and, last but not 
least, urbanism and architecture (as the traditionally German counties cherish a 
very important architectural heritage). 
The results of the elections proved though that rational choice functions in the 
case of the voters in Romania: the very high electoral stake of the general elections 
in November 2004 (an emphasis that was quite different from the case of the local 
elections) determined the voters to avoid wasting their votes on small parties, 
which would have been far from passing the electoral threshold anyway. These 
decisions were evident in the case of the ethnic based parties, and especially in the 
vase of FDGR. Only 60% of the German electorate supported the Forum, the rest 
headed towards other parties, probably reasoning that the party will gain enough 
votes to obtain one seat in the Chamber anyway, whereas other political parties 
might need the vote to strengthen their position, on much higher stakes. 
UAR – The Armenians’ Union in Romania 
The Armenians’ Union in Romania remarked itself on the political stage with 
an apparently ”dangerous” message for an ethnic based organization, first of all, 
and a very small one – which is the case of the Armenian minority, in the second 
place. The message of UAR’s candidate, Varujan Pambuccian, targeted not his own 
ethnic group, but the whole Romanian citizenry, and the IT&C community in par-
ticular (the group that produces 10% of the GDP2). The arguments that stayed at 
the basis of UAR’s candidacy were the bills that he had initiated and supported in 
the previous legislature, some of which are already in place (the e-signature Law, 
the e-commerce Law, the Law against e-criminality), and others which are pending 
at the beginning of 2005 (the Law of the e-notary, the demonopolisation of the 
communication market, the cancellation of the taxes for digital cameras, decreasing 
the income tax for the soft engineers to 8%). The UAR’s electoral promises were 
not too many3 and they targeted the same group – the one of software clients and 
                                                
1 Other ethnic groups have increased in number are the Greeks, the Croats and the Turks. 
However, there are reasons of serious concern here: on one hand, it could be that in 1992, con-
tinuing the social habits learned during communism, individuals from ethnic groups other than 
the majoritarian one did not dare to declare this to the census operators. It is the obvious case of the 
Rroma minority, since estimates of experts belonging to this group evaluate the number of Rroma 
people to be at least twice the official record; in 1992 it was also the case of the religious minority of 
Greek Catholics, who did not declare their real denomination for fear of repercussions. This could 
explain an increased number of Greeks in 2002. On the other hand, in the case of the Croats for 
instance, the larger number of people declaring to belong to this ethnic group, as well as the spec-
tacular jump from 486 votes in 1996, to 11 084 in 2000, and 10 331 in 2004, could be explained 
through the fact that deputy Mihai Radan has obtained double citizenship and Croatian passports 
for the members of Croatians’ Union in Romania, which meant traveling without a visa in the 
Schengen space until 2000, and an automatic EU citizenship after 2004. 
2 Romania’s agriculture produces, comparatively, 13% of the GDP and it presumes involving 
half of the country’s population (data extracted from the interview of Mihai Stepan Cazazian with 
Varujan Pambuccian, in Ararat, no. 21 (306), 2004. 
3 Interview with deputy Varujan Pambuccian, November 24th, 2004. 
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providers, of those interested in communication and in the formation of a regional 
market in the field or in the introduction of simple and clear procedures with the 
public authorities. 
The solution initially seemed an extremely risky one, but it managed to con-
vince the target group; Mr. Pambuccian stressed that he would have liked the im-
plementation of these laws and the adoption of new ones to be a gift of the 
Armenian minority to the majoritarian population, but that since the very low 
number of Armenians (officially, under 2 000) and the Electoral Law prevented this 
gesture, the support of the IT&C community was essential under the circum-
stances. The votes received in elections seem to confirm the support of the IT&C 
group (as the UAR scored almost 10 000 votes with an ethnic community surveyed 
as five times smaller), although Pambuccian might be facing another obstacle: los-
ing the support of his own ethnic group, who could feel neglected. 
D DAY – ELECTIONS 
According to the Electoral Law (Art. 4, align. 12), ”Through derogation from 
the provisions of Art. 5, align. 8, the organizations belonging to the national mi-
norities can submit the same list of candidates in several constituencies”1. The eth-
nic minorities are listed together with the rest of the candidates and anyone can 
vote for them. Deets showed that the proportional voting on lists avoids the prob-
lem of forcing each individual to choose a single legal identity in order to maintain 
the manoeuvres of the ”minority” voters2. This means that the people who are not 
members of an ethnic minority do not have too many incentives to vote for these 
organizations. Since the ethnic identities are randomly defined through the Elec-
toral Law, the simplest manner to evaluate the level of political representation is to 
compare the figures from the latest two censuses, on one hand, with the votes re-
ceived by these groups, on the other. One should observe, first of all, that there are 
ethnic groups that did not figure in the 1992 census (like the Albanians or Italians), 
but who occupied a parliamentary seat for several legislatures. Other less numer-
ous groups, such as the Armenians, Croats, Jews or Greeks, manage to rally 
around the flag and gather much more votes than in the case of the official census 
data. Indeed, if one were to build the calculus on pure mathematics, even more bi-
zarre results might be observed: Armenians got 551% of the votes of the commu-
nity, the Croats 151%, the Jews 146%, the Greeks 111%. But cases even stranger are 
the ones of the Albanians with 1.050%, the Macedonians with 1.402% and the 
Ruthenians, with 1.117% (see Table 2). All these three groups met with internal 
conflicts and also with contestations from within and outside their rank and file: 
Oana Manolescu was accused that she does not even speak Albanian, Vasile Savu 
was contested not only by the Romanian Macedonians but also by the Republic of 
Macedonia, whereas Gheorghe Firczak turned from Hungarian into Ruthenian in 
2000 and was contested by the entire opposition. It is also very probable that these 
groups have been over-motivated and the results confirm Deets’s theory3, accord-
ing to which there might be a logical explanation between the size of the minority 
                                                
1 Legislaţie privind alegerile parlamenrate... cit., p. 7. 
2 Steven DEETS, art. cit., p. 47. 
3 Ibidem. 
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and the total number of received votes. With the exception of the Hungarian mi-
nority, the bigger the minority is, the lower the percentage of voters in favour of 
that organization. The logic is that it does not make any difference if the German 
Democratic Forum, the Rroma Party or the Lipovans’ Russians Community receive 
7 000 or 20 000 votes, since they shall receive a parliamentary seat anyhow, and 
since the 2002 census data do not show any ethnic group to exceed 70 000 people 
(with the exception of the Rroma) it is less probable that these would pass the elec-
toral threshold in a ”natural” manner. And it is also a confirmation of the fact that 
the hopes from June 2004 regarding renunciation to the ethnic vote still do not 
have any real basis. 
The oddest example refers to the organizations that claim to represent the Ital-
ian minority: from six in 1996, they were two in 2000 and three in 2004, while this 
minority was not even mentioned in the 1992 census. However, the group did have 
a political representative, although a highly contested one, since 1996. The fact that 
the majority of Italians are concentrated in one city (for example, Iaşi) merely fuels 
the suspicion that the ethnic entrepreneurs only form ethnic parties in order to ob-
tain a parliamentary seat. It also the case of other groups, who receive ”concen-
trated votes”: the Bulgarians in Bucureşti and Botoşani, the Macedonians in 
Hunedoara, the Russians in Tulcea, the Poles in Suceava, the Germans in Sibiu, the 
Tatars in Constanţa, the Armenians in Bucureşti, Iaşi and Constanţa, the Croats in 
Caraş, the Serbs in Timiş and Caraş. The increasing numbers of these representa-
tives (13 in 1992, 16 in 1996, 19 in 2000 and 18 in 2004) come to support this suppo-
sition. Another explanation to this increased number of ethnic organizations is the 
fact that some of the minorities used to constitute a single (common) ethnic 
party1, namely the Turks/Tatars (who were the first to separate, in 1990), the 
Serbs/Croats (the latter withdrawing from the party and founding their own or-
ganization at the beginning of 1992) and the Czechs/Slovaks (who apparently split 
after the visit to Romania of the Czech President, Vaclav Havel). In the first two 
cases the situation is by now quite clear, and each of the four minorities involved 
have their own organization and political representative in the parliament (actu-
ally, there are three or four organizations representing the Turks and one the 
Tatars, one representing the Serbs, and two the Croats – in this latter case, it is even 
more spectacular that Mihai Radan managed to gather enough extra-votes to sur-
pass his newly-born challenger, the Croatians’ Democratic Union in Romania, who 
also got over 7 000 votes). The Czech/Slovak case is more complicated though. The 
Democratic Union of the Czechs and Slovaks in Romania (UDSCR) was founded in 
1990, and presented itself as a strong and serious party during the elections that 
were held during that year and in 1992. Apparently, the smaller Czech minority 
has been overshadowed by the higher number of Slovaks, which led to a split in 
1996, and to the creation of the Czechs’ Union in Romania (UCR). Since the former 
common organization refused to change its name, on the grounds that it still had 
ethnic Czechs among its ranks, UCR could not be parliamentary represented in the 
2000-2004 legislature (although it had managed to pass the electoral threshold for 
ethnic minorities), since the Constitution and the Electoral Law stipulate that only 
one ethnic party can represent a minority. Since the legislative provisions did not 
change in 2004 (on the contrary, the conditions for enrolling in elections became 
even more demanding – such as gathering signatures from 15% of the members of 
                                                
1 Ciprian-Călin ALIONESCU, art. cit., p. 69. 
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the ethnic group, according to the census figures), the Czechs’ representatives 
gave up running in the elections, since there was no chance for them to obtain a 
separate MP seat. 
The explanation might also lie in the dispute for the resources that entitles one 
ethnic group to a parliamentarian position; it is the case of the Turks, the Macedo-
nians, the Bulgarians, the Italians, the Poles and the Croatians. Under these cir-
cumstances, the ethnic groups have nine new MPs. 
Furthermore, the Romanian law generates a basic theoretical question about 
fairness, in spite of the good intentions that support this type of positive discrimi-
nation. For example, all the ethnic minorities (with the exception of UDMR) re-
ceived less than 37 000 votes and obtained a parliamentary seat, whereas parties 
such as PNŢCD (with 188 268 votes) or PER (with 73 001 votes) received none. 
However, one could argue that one’s identity as an ethnic minority is more im-
portant than that of a Christian Democrat or a Green (or of other parties that may 
represent one’s interests), because in a way they cannot represent minorities. Even-
tually, one could admit that many political elites, as do average voters, might think 
in ethnic terms – considerations that involve, however, pragmatism rather than 
liberal rights. 
 
Table 2 
Results Obtained by the Ethnic Parties/Organizations in Romania  
at the November 26th 2000 and November 28th 2004 General Elections 
 (in Bold-italic the Groups that Obtained An MP Seat) 
Ethnic Party/Organization No. of valid 
expressed votes 
on November 
26th 2000 
No. of valid 
expressed votes 
on November 
28th 2004 
% from the 
ethnic group 
in November 
2004 
1992 
Census 
2002 
Census
The League of Albanians 
Association 
The Albanians’ Cultural League 
10 453 
 
7 798 
5 011 
 
– 
1.050% Not 
figuring 
 
477
Armenians’ Union in Romania 21 302 9 810 551% 2 023 1 780
Bulgarian Union from Banat 
The Bulgarian Cultural 
Association 
The ”Bratsvo” Bulgarians’ 
Community in Romania 
The Union of ”Pavlicheni” 
Bulgarians in Romania 
 20 085  
8 092 
 
5 923  
 
497 
15 283 
6 240 
 
4 065 
 
– 
190% 9 935 8 025
The Democratic Union of the  
Slovaks and Czechs in Romania 
The Czechs’ Union in Romania 
5 686 
 
1 539 
5 950 
 
– 
34% 20 672 17 226
Croatians’ Union in Romania 
The Democratic Union of the 
Croatians in Romania 
The Democratic Leagues of the 
Croatians in Romania 
11 084 
2 059 
 
1 329 
10 331 
7 769 
 
– 
151% 4 180 6 807
The Greek Union in Romania 
The Greek Community – Iaşi 
The Greek Community – Prahova 
The Elpis Greek Community – 
Constanţa 
15 007 
 2 072  
1 992  
449 
 7 161 
–  
– 
– 
111% 3 897 6 472
The Jewish Federations 
Community in Romania 
12 629 8 449 146% 9 107 5 785
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Ethnic Party/Organization No. of valid 
expressed votes 
on November 
26th 2000 
No. of valid 
expressed votes 
on November 
28th 2004 
% from the 
ethnic group 
in November 
2004 
1992 
Census 
2002 
Census
The German Democratic Forum 
in Romania 
40 844 36 166 60% 119 436 59 764
The League of the Italian 
Communities in Romania 
The Italian Community in 
Romania – Iaşi 
Italians’ Association in 
Romania RoAsIt 
16 266 
 
21263 
– 
 
5 181 
 
6 168 
 
 
187% 
 
Not 
figuring 
3 288
The Slavic Macedonians 
Association in Romania 
Macedonians’ Association in 
Romania 
8 809 
 
– 
9 595 
 
9 750 1.402% 
 
6 999 695
Poles’ Union in Romania  
”Dom Polski” – Bucharest Poles’ 
Union in Romania 
The Cultural Union Association 
of Poles in Romania  
5 055 
1 619 
 
– 
– 
5 473 
 
5 159 
 
153% 
 
4 247 3 559
Roma’s Party 
The Christian Centre of Roma in 
Romania 
71 786 
12 171 
56 076 
               – 
11% 409 723 
       
535 140
The Lipoveni Russians’ 
Community 
11 558 10 562 30% 38 688 35 791
The Cultural Union of the 
Ruthenians in Romania 
6 942 2 871 1.117% 350 257
The Serbs’ Union in Romania 8 784 6 643 30% 29 080 22 561
The Democratic Union of The 
Turkish-Muslim Tatars in 
Romania 
10 380 6 452 27% 24 649 23 935
The Turkish Democratic Union 
in Romania 
The Turkish Community in 
Romania 
Ethnic Turks’ Association 
The Muslim Turkish Union in 
Romania 
6 675 
 
3 953 
 
– 
– 
7 715 
 
– 
 
7 396 
6 527 
24% 29 533 32 098
The Ukrainians’ Union in 
Romania 
The Democratic Union of the 
Ukrainians in Romania 
9 404 
 
5 843 
10 888 
 
– 
18% 66 483 61 098
The General Union of the 
Associations of the ”Huţul” 
Ethnic Group in Romania 
1 225 – – Not 
figuring 
Not 
figuring 
 
The high number of MPs representing minorities in Romania (with the excep-
tion of the Hungarian one) and the procedures through which they are elected 
were the subject of media criticism. It is true that in a country that counts 485 MPs 
(anyway, far too many when compared with the size of the population), 18 ethnic 
minority representatives might raise a question mark. The answer lies in the voting 
behaviour of their parliamentary group1, which was considered, with no exception, 
since 1990, the safest ally of any government, always voting in its favour, accord-
ing to the protocols. Consequently, all the post-1989 governments were interesting 
                                                
1 Ibidem, p. 69. 
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in maintaining (and even increasing) the political representation of the ethnic mi-
norities through positive discrimination. The 2000-2004 PSD government made no 
exception to the rule, especially since its position was not as secure as the party 
claimed it to be, at least in the beginning of the legislature. On the other hand, the 
minority MPs probably did not want to endanger their presence in the legislative 
body – especially since a single amendment in the Electoral Law might have se-
verely reduced (and for some of the group even put an end to the political repre-
sentation through very drastic conditions). In the case of the smaller ethnic group it 
was also better to find solutions to their claims and problems through negotiations 
rather than through arguments with the government, in spite of the accusations 
from the media and civil society of ”collaborationism”. What is clear is that many 
of the voters for ethnic parties such as Albanians, Armenians, Bulgarians, Croats, 
Greeks, Italians, Poles, Ruthenians or even ”Macedonians”, for different reasons, 
do not actually belong to the minority which they voted, as one could see above. 
As far as UDMR is concerned, the party still represents the Hungarian minor-
ity in the Parliament. In spite of the pessimistic predictions1, UDMR obtained 
slightly more than 6% for both chambers, a similar result with the one of the pre-
vious elections. The diminished percentage could be explained with the decrease 
of approximately 200 000 of the Hungarian population (a drop of 11.7% since 
1992) either through an increased rate of mortality, a decreased birth rate, as well 
as through emigration to either Hungary or Western European countries. The 
phenomenon characterises the Romanian society as a whole (for instance, the 
Romanian population decreased with almost one million – which means around 
5% – since 1992, due to the same factors; the most drastic diminution is known by 
the German minority, with a drop of almost 50% caused by immigration to Ger-
many and Austria) only that in the case of the minorities the effects are amplified 
by the relatively small size of the group. The Rroma minority, explainable by the 
traditionally high birth rate of this group and an increase of its self-awareness, 
gives the only exception. 
The figures in Table 3 show not only the decrease in rough numbers of the 
pro-UDMR votes; this fact is also reflected in a decrease of the number of parlia-
mentary seats: from 12 to 10 in the Senate, and from 27 to 22 in the Chamber of 
Deputies. According to the statements of several UDMR leaders2, UCM’s participa-
tion on the AP lists did not influence the results, the decrease being actually caused 
by the low turnout rate of the Hungarian electorate. The number of votes and the 
territorial distribution shows that nearly all Hungarian electors support UDMR in 
the parliamentary elections, confirming the results of the pre-electoral polls (which 
credited the level of support within the Hungarian population at about 85%). It is 
for the first time though that UDMR faces competitors in general elections, even if 
both challengers had to enrol on the lists of other parties. This move to which UCM 
had to resort was denounced by this formation as a the ultimate evidence for the 
lack of freedom and democracy. The UCM representatives considered that UDMR 
made its way to the Parliament on the margin of democracy, and with the help of 
                                                
1 The electoral threshold is 5%. In several public opinion polls, ordered by different orga-
nizations and performed by professional pollsters, UDMR was not exceeding this limit: CURS 
survey, September 6th – 5%, INSOMAR survey, September 22-25th – 5%, INSOMAR computer 
assisted interviews, October 4-5th – 5%, ISS survey, October 7-10th – 4.47%, CURS survey, October 
14-20th – 5% (data extracted from http://www.politic.ro/sondaje.php). 
2 Divers News Bulletin, December 9th, 2004. 
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the incumbent government1 (i.e. PSD). However, the elections results show that 
there is actually no clear relationship between the party’s inclination to collaborate 
with any type of government on one hand, and the support granted by its mem-
bers on the other. 
 
Table 3 
Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) – 
Chamber of Deputies and Senate, 1990-2004 
 Votes – 
Senate 
% of 
Votes – 
Senate
Seats – 
Senate
% of 
Seats – 
Senate
Votes – 
Chamber
% of 
Votes – 
Chamber
Seats – 
Chamber 
% of 
Seats – 
Chamber 
1990 – 
Elections 
1 004 353 7.20 12 10.08 991 601 7.23 29 7.29 
1992 – 
Elections 
831 469 7.58 12 8.39 811 290 7.46 27 8.23 
1996 – 
Elections 
837 760 6.82 11 7.69 812 228 6.64 25 7.29 
2000 – 
Elections 
751 310 
 
6.90 
 
12 
 
8.57 
 
736 863 
 
6.80 
 
27 
 
7.83 
 
2004 –
Elections 
637 109 6.23 10 7.14 628 125 6.17 22 6.72 
 
Source: Pavel CÂMPEANU, ”Electoral Research in Romania”, in Hans Dieter KLINGEMANN, 
Ekkehard MOOCHMANN, Kenneth NEWTON (eds.), Elections in Central and Eastern 
Europe – The First Wave, Sigma, Berlin, 2000 + calculations of the author for the 2000 and 
2004 elections. 
 
On the whole, UDMR managed to do well in the 2004 elections, in spite of the 
splinters that did not exist four years ago. These results might be also explained 
through the fact that Hungarian voters started to perceive in reality the positive ef-
fects of decentralization, mirrored in the increased funding and support granted to 
the local communities. 
POST-ELECTORAL NEGOTIATIONS 
After November 28th 2004, UDMR started the negotiations for a very likely 
participation in government. Within this framework, UDMR seemed to be more 
and more interested to actively promote several of its campaign themes: autonomy 
and decentralization. The experience from the previous legislatures (especially 
since 1996) shows that the minority representatives placed themselves on the side 
of the government each time important motions or laws were voted. That is why 
their support was important. But not all the ”minorities” sold their votes cheap. 
                                                
1 Ibidem, p. 8. 
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The results of the elections, in which none of the two main competitors (the Na-
tional Union PSD+PUR on one hand, and the D.A. Alliance – PNL-PD – on the 
other) managed to obtain the majority, led to an increased importance of the votes 
of the ethnic minorities representatives, either Hungarian or any other ethnic 
group. Even one week after the elections, the leader of the minorities’ parliamen-
tarian group, Varujan Pambuccian, avoided a clear-cut answer, whereas his col-
leagues expressed diverging opinions regarding the collaboration with the two 
main political actors in the Parliament. 
UDMR wanted to hold office, but the lack of a clear majority and the uncer-
tainty of the results of the second round of the presidential elections made it look 
undecided; because of this lack of firmness it is accused by the media of bluffing, 
of trying ”to force the hand”, and of playing double games. One week after the 
first round of elections, UDMR starts negotiations with the PSD+PUR Union, ap-
parently convinced by the fact that this is the only formation able to form the 
government that could be backed up by a parliamentary majority. UDMR’s re-
quests through negotiations aim not only at local autonomy and decentralisation 
(e.g. the Covasna prefecture is offered to PSD in return for the chair of the 
County Council), but also even a vice-premiership position and several other 
ministerial positions (calculated on the basis of an algorithm). All these in return 
for supporting PSD’s candidate, Adrian Năstase, in the second round of the 
presidential election. 
Although the Hungarian electorate who voted in the second round (although 
in a much lower degree than in the first round) did in fact respect the recom-
mendations of their political leaders, and voted for Năstase, the incumbent 
prime-minister lost in front of the D.A. Alliance’s candidate, Traian Băsescu. Even 
if for a few days a cohabitation was envisaged (between a D.A. President on one 
hand, and a PSD+PUR+UDMR government on the other), all these predictions 
were shattered by a blunder of the still functioning president of the country, Ion 
Iliescu, to pardon the coal miners leader Miron Cozma, imprisoned for 18 years for 
undermining the state power. Even during the electoral campaign, Béla Markó, 
UDMR’s presidential candidate, had declared that he refuses to take into consid-
eration the possibility of pardoning Cozma, characterised this as a hypothetical 
gesture (at that time) with a purely electoral character, and condemned it as such1. 
On December 17th he defined the pardoning as ”stuttering”, and finally mentioned 
the beginning of negotiations with the D.A. Alliance2. It was a logical move, since 
an opposite one would have meant a gesture of discreditation. One week later, the 
UDMR was a full-rights member in the Government of Romania, having signed a 
clear protocol with the D.A. Alliance. It obtained the vice-premiership position 
(Béla Markó – also delegate for the coordination of activities in the fields of culture, 
education and EU integration), as well as the leadership of the Ministry of Com-
munication and Information Technology (Zsolt Nagy), together with the deputy 
positions in the Ministry of Public Administration and Territorial Management 
(Laszlo Borbely) and of the Ministry of Economy and Commerce (Iuliu Winkler), 
                                                
1 See the Naţional daily, November 6th 2004. This aspect is important not only from the ethical 
point of view, but also because it represents a proof that Ion Iliescu’s gesture during the very last 
days of his mandate should not have come as a shock to the political body and civil society taken to-
gether. A closer look at the central print media dating one a half months before shows that this was 
a maneuver that (as long as Bela is asked by a journalist about it) was known and calculated before. 
2 See the Ziua daily, December 18th, 2004. 
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and the Prefectures of the counties Bistriţa Năsăud (Janos Szilagy), Maramureş 
(Győngyike Bőndi), Mehedinţi, and the county of Covasna (Győrgy Ervin – a posi-
tion that PSD did not want to grant to UDMR). 
CONCLUSION 
The Romanian case is very striking, due to its type of representation and to the 
structure of competition. The fact that UDMR managed to obtain not only a signifi-
cant parliamentary representation, but also to play a pivotal role between PSD and 
the D.A. Alliance, granted the leadership of this party a great deal of influence 
(much more, for instance, than the one enjoyed by the similar party in Slovakia). 
The interests of the ethnic representatives are mainly linked with the offer of the 
Government (e.g. linguistic and educational rights), but also to the negotiations re-
garding autonomy and decentralisation (a task left by the other ethnic parties 
mainly to UDMR and explainable through the relatively large dimension of the 
group compared with the rest of the minorities). 
We noticed that ethnic parties in general, and the Romanian ones in particular, 
do not fall completely into the framework of the existing definitions and character-
istics of political parties. However, drawing on Katz and Mair1, we could consider 
that the ethnic parties did not begin as integrative organizations (they primarily 
represent the interest of their own ethnic group, rather than primarily seeking to 
broaden their appeal to other groups). Also, most of the Romanian ethnic parties 
often did not begin as electoral organizations, but as pressure groups or cultural 
organizations; however, over time they sought to place their representatives into 
the power structures, due to a shift in goal orientation that occurred as the tempta-
tion to pursue political power grew (when it became more apparent that the most 
effective means to influence power relations was to hold office). In order to do this, 
the Romanian ethnic parties had to make appeals across the borders of their own 
groups. However, the extent to which they managed to accomplish this goal de-
pended on other factors such as: the institutional rules of the game, the strength of 
the existing party system, and the structure of the competition. 
During the last decade, UDMR started to resemble more and more a genuine 
political party2. For instance, the party placed one senator in each parliamentarian 
committee, based on the professional background of that person, so that it would 
fit best the profile of the senatorial committee. When compared with the rest of the 
parties, it managed to maintain its electoral support, a fact that can be explained 
though more through the ethnic vote and less through a better performance than 
the rest of the parties3. This support is mirrored in the maintenance of the number 
of MPs who have been elected on the UDMR lists. Moreover, a rough calculation 
proves that the incumbency rate is approximately 83% for the Senate and 66% for 
                                                
1 Richard S. KATZ and Peter MAIR, Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Demo-
cracy, Sage, London, 1995, p. 20. 
2 Zoltan KANTOR and Nandor BARDI, ”UDMR şi coaliţia guvernamentală (1996-2000)”, 
in Sfera Politicii, no. 97-98, 2001, p. 10. 
3 Ibidem, p. 11. 
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the Chamber of Deputies1, which means that the party is experiencing a profes-
sionalization of its representatives at the parliamentarian level. 
These facts come to support the hypothesis of the ”cartelisation”2 of the eth-
nic parties, and especially of UDMR, which presents several of the features of the 
cartel party: a relatively diffused level of distribution of politically relevant re-
sources, the fact that politics is regarded as a profession, the basis of party compe-
tition needs managerial skills and efficiency, some of the party’s resources come 
from the state, the party gains privileged access to state-regulated channels of 
communication. The electoral battle is led for better access and control of the state 
resources. An illustrative example is given by the vote for the Constitution in 
2003, when PSD, PNL, PD, UDMR, and the ethnic minorities cartelised in a rela-
tively homogenous political class and voted for a Constitution that guaranteed 
their long-term interests3. 
The support granted by UDMR and the rest of the ethnic minorities to the PSD 
government until 2004 seems to have affected somehow the relationship between 
the minorities and the rest of the parties. The frictions exist, but they are not un-
solvable. If in the case of a ”regular” party, participation in government does affect 
the relation with the voters, in the case of the ethnic parties the participation in 
government should be considered also from the point of view of the relation be-
tween the other parties and their own voters. Because the electorates, the party 
cadres, and the members are socially heterogeneous, this aspect might lead to fac-
tionalism and tensions, when the ethnic parties are asked to support certain gov-
ernmental socio-economic policies in return for institutional reforms in the benefit 
of the ethnic minorities. A more drastic measure might lead to losing the voters 
since parties could be punished for participating in government4. In the case of 
Romania, it was clear that this participation, or the parliamentarian support and 
sharing the responsibility, together with the compromises and bargains regarding 
certain less popular socio-economic measures, did not lead to the loss of support 
from the electorate of the ethnic minorities. 
However, it seems that UDMR and its smaller scale partners have reached a 
crossroads. If they continue to focus on their traditional voters, their political fu-
ture will be limited to the role of ”balancing the scales”, which could be a risky po-
sition. Yet, another alternative may be no less risky since, if the emphasis on 
minority rights disappears from their manifesto, the ethnic voters might lose the 
clear motivation to vote for the only party that emphasizes their needs. In terms of 
needs, the hope to reconcile the Hungarians’ request for a higher degree of institu-
tional autonomy with the majority’s apprehension of the fragmentation of the state 
sovereignty still stands as challenge for the representatives of the ethnic minorities. 
On the other hand, scholars like Stroschein5 consider that the Romanian ethnic par-
                                                
1 Calculations of the author based on the data contained in Cartea Albastră a Democraţiei. Un 
ghid al instituţiilor publice centrale din România, Asociaţia Pro-Democraţia, Bucureşti, 2001. 
2 For more details see Richard S. KATZ and Peter MAIR, op. cit., pp. 17-25. 
3 Daniel BARBU, Republica absentă. Politică şi societate în România postcomunistă, 2nd edition, 
Nemira, Bucureşti, 2004, pp. 273-274. 
4 In Western Europe, for instance, the Basque and Catalonian parties have avoided this 
dilemma by refusing ministerial responsibility, whereas the Italian Lega Nord did not gain any 
sorts of benefits after participating in government. 
5 Sherill STROSCHEIN, ”Measuring Ethnic Party Success in Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine”, 
in Problems of Post-communism, vol. 48, no. 4, July-August 2001, p. 68. 
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ties demonstrate the highest degree of success when compared with their corre-
spondents in other Central and Eastern European countries. It is true that they 
demonstrate a lower degree of success in the counties where they are either the 
majority or the minority, and higher levels of party success in counties with split 
demographics. 
With all the deficiencies, there are several advantages of the political represen-
tation system in Romania: first of all, it guarantees a broad representation of ethnic 
minorities, and secondly it is quiet easy to administer (since it does not require any 
supplementary efforts or procedures when organising elections). One of the big-
gest disadvantages is that it starts from the presumption that ethnic minorities are 
unitary actors, while in reality the system encourages a tough competition for re-
sources between representatives belonging to the same ethnic minority group. This 
is also fuelled by the vague provisions in the Constitution and the ones dealing 
with the Council for National Minorities (which, in the opinion of many ethnic 
representatives, is only a tool of equalising the otherwise extremely different 
”weights” of the ethnic groups and turning them into servile instruments in the 
hand of any government). Other problems lie in the representation of splitting 
minorities or non-existing minorities (such as ”Macedonians”) or in the fact that 
individuals claiming to represent a certain ethnic group are not actually the bear-
ers of that ethnicity. 
However, even with its drawbacks, the Romanian system is preferable to the 
ones in which the political representation of ethnic minorities is neglected or even 
forbidden. 
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ANNEX 
 
 
 
Names and Acronyms of the Political Parties Used in the Text 
 
Romanian English Acronym 
Alianţa”Dreptate şi Adevăr” 
PNL-PD 
”Truth And Justice” Alliance D.A. PNL-PD 
Acţiunea Populară Popular Action A.P. 
Partidul Democrat Democrat Party PD 
Partidul Ecologist din România The Green Party PER 
Forţa Democrată The Democratic Force FDR 
Partidul Naţional Liberal National Liberal Party PNL 
Partidul Naţional Ţărănesc 
Creştin Democrat 
The National Peasant Party 
Christian Democrat 
PNŢCD 
Partidul Noua Generaţie New Generation Party PNG 
Partidul România Mare Greater Romania Party PRM 
Partidul Social Democrat The Social Democrat Party PSD 
Partidul Umanist din România 
(Social Liberal) 
The Humanist Party in Romania 
(Social Liberal) 
PUR-SL 
Uniunea pentru Reconstrucţia 
României 
The Union for Romania’s 
Reconstruction 
URR 
Asociaţia Liga Albanezilor din 
România 
Liga Culturală a Albanezilor din 
România 
The League of Albanians 
Association 
The Albanians’ Cultural League 
AABR 
 
LCAR 
Uniunea Armenilor din România Armenians’ Union in Romania UAR 
Uniunea Bulgară din Banat 
Asociaţia Culturală Bulgară din 
România 
Comunitatea ”Bratsvo” a 
Bulgarilor din România 
Bulgarian Union From Banat 
The Bulgarian Cultural 
Association 
The ”Bratsvo” Bulgarians’ 
Community in Romania 
UBB 
ACBR 
 
”BRATSVO” 
Uniunea Democratică a 
Slovacilor şi Cehilor din 
România 
Uniunea Cehilor din România 
The Democratic Union of The 
Slovaks and Czechs in Romania
 
The Czechs’ Union in Romania 
U-SLOVACI 
 
 
UCR 
Uniunea Croaţilor din Romania 
Uniunea Democrată a Croaţilor 
în România 
Liga Democrată a Croaţilor din 
România 
Croatians’ Union in Romania 
The Democratic Union of the 
Croatians’ in Romania 
The Democratic League of the 
Croatians in Romania 
UCR 
UDCR 
 
LDCR 
Uniunea Elenă din România 
Comunitatea Elenă – Iaşi 
Comunitatea Elenă – Prahova 
Comunitatea Elenă Elpis – 
Constanţa 
The Greek Union in Romania 
The Greek Community – Iaşi 
The Greek Community – Prahova 
The Elpis Greek Community – 
Constanţa 
UER 
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Romanian English Acronym 
Federaţia Comunităţilor Evreieşti 
din România 
The Federation of Jewish 
Communities in Romania 
F EVREI 
Forumul Democrat al Germanilor 
din România 
The German Democratic Forum 
in Romania 
FDGR 
Liga Comunităţilor Italiene 
 
Comunitatea Italiană din 
România – Iaşi 
Asociaţia Italienilor din România 
RoAsIt 
The League of the Italian 
Communities in Romania 
The Italian Community in 
Romania – Iaşi 
Italians’ Association in Romania 
RoAsIt 
LCI 
 
C ITALIANĂ 
 
ROASIT 
Asociaţia Democratică a 
Macedonenilor Slavi din 
România 
Asociaţia Culturală a 
Macedonenilor din România 
The Slavic Macedonians 
Democratic Association in 
Romania 
Macedonians’ Cultural 
Association in Romania 
AD-MACEDONENI 
 
 
AC-MACEDONENI 
Uniunea Polonezilor din 
România 
Uniunea Polonezilor din 
România ”Dom Polski” – 
Bucureşti 
Asociaţia Uniunea Culturală a 
Polonezilor din România 
Poles’ Union in Romania 
 
”Dom Polski” – Bucharest Poles’ 
Union in Romania 
 
The Cultural Union Association of 
Poles in Romania 
UPR 
 
DOM POLSKI 
 
 
AUCPR 
 
Partida Romilor Social 
Democrată din România 
Centrul Creştin al Romilor din 
România 
Roma’s Party 
 
The Christian Centre of Roma in 
Romania 
ROMII 
 
CCRR 
Comunitatea Ruşilor Lipoveni 
din România 
The Lipoveni Russians’ 
Community 
C-RUŞI LIPOVENI 
Uniunea Culturală a Rutenilor 
din România 
The Cultural Union of the 
Ruthenians in Romania 
U-RUTENI 
Uniunea Sârbilor din România The Serbs’ Union in Romania U-SÂRBI 
 
Uniunea Democrată a Tătarilor 
Turco-Musulmani din 
România 
 
The Democratic Union of the 
Turkish-Muslim Tatars in 
Romania 
 
UDTTR 
Uniunea Democrată Turcă din 
România 
Comunitatea Turcă din România
 
Asociaţia Etnicilor Turci 
Uniunea Turcă Musulmană din 
România 
The Turkish Democratic Union in 
Romania 
The Turkish Community in 
Romania 
Ethnic Turks’ Association 
The Muslim Turkish Union in 
Romania 
U-TURCĂ 
 
CTR 
 
AET 
UTM 
Uniunea Ucrainenilor din 
România 
Uniunea Democrată a 
Ucrainenilor din România 
The Ukrainians’ Union in 
Romania 
The Democratic Union of the 
Ukrainians in Romania 
UUR 
 
UDUR 
 
